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SHAW v. LINDHEIM: l THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ATTEMPT
TO EQUALIZE THE ODDS IN COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT.
I. INTRODUCTION
"When the scales of justice are unbalanced, the Equalizer sets them
straight." 2 While this may be an accurate description of the lead charac-
ter in the television series, The Equalizer, it does not describe the current
state of affairs in the Ninth Circuit for copyright infringement suits. The
Ninth Circuit has failed to balance the scales of justice for copyright in-
fringement actions because it has not created a viable framework for ad-
judicating such actions. To maintain a successful claim for copyright
infringement, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged infringer
has taken an improper amount of the plaintiff's copyrighted work.3 This
is known as the requirement of substantial similarity.4 For decades, the
Ninth Circuit has attempted to articulate a viable test for determining
whether one work is substantially similar to another to constitute
infringement.
The Ninth Circuit recently addressed this problem in Shaw v. Lind-
heim 5 when it reformulated the traditional two-part test for substantial
similarity.6 The primary inquiry in Shaw was whether substantial simi-
larity existed between the plaintiff's script and the defendants' pilot
script to constitute a triable issue on the claim for copyright infringe-
ment.7 In Shaw, Columbia Broadcasting System ("CBS") produced the
weekly television series, allegedly created by Richard Lindheim ("Lind-
heim") and Michael Sloan ("Sloan"), entitled The Equalizer.' The plain-
tiff, Lou Shaw ("Shaw"), contended that CBS obtained The Equalizer
storyline after he had submitted his script, The Equalizer, to defendant
1. 908 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990).
2. The Equalizer (USA Cable Network, October 15, 1990).
3. M. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, § 9.2, at 266 (1989).
4. Id.
5. 908 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990).
6. This two-part test was developed in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) and will be discussed in the latter portion of
this note.
7. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990).
8. Id. at 533.
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Lindheim as the head of the National Broadcasting Company's ("NBC")
Dramatic Programming Department.9 Despite the strong similarities be-
tween Shaw's script and the defendants' pilot script, the district court
granted the defense's motion for summary judgment on Shaw's claim for
copyright infringement.10 Thereafter, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
thereby enunciated a new rule for determining copyright infringement as
a matter of law. 11
This note examines the flaws of the Shaw rule, particularly its failure
to distinguish between the separate forms of substantial similarity as they
apply to infringement actions: substantial similarity as an element of
permissible copying and substantial similarity as a second element of
copyright infringement, also referred to as unlawful appropriation.12
This examination demonstrates that the Shaw rule fails to preserve the
tenuous balance between protection necessarily afforded to authors under
the Copyright Act and the freedom of others to create works outside the
area protected against infringement. Finally, this note recommends an
alternative approach the Ninth Circuit should have adopted to provide a
more viable framework for analyzing infringement actions.
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Shaw v. Lindheim 13 involved an embittered battle between two
screen writers wherein Lou Shaw claimed that Richard Lindheim mis-
appropriated his script entitled The Equalizer. 14 Lou Shaw is a success-
ful writer and producer in the entertainment industry.15 During the
1976-1977 television season, Shaw had eight network television programs
on the air. These programs were: Quincy, Nancy Drew, McCloud,
Columbo, Switch, Maude, Six Million Dollar Man, and Barnaby Jones. 
16
The instant dispute began in February of 1978, when Shaw entered
into an option contract with Lindheim regarding The Equalizer. 7 At
that time, Lindheim was an executive in the Dramatic Programming Di-
vision of NBC. 8 The contract granted NBC the option of developing
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 537. Basically, the court held that satisfaction of the extrinsic prong of the
Krofft test creates a triable issue for copyright infringement claims. Shaw, 908 F.2d at 537.
12. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
13. 908 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990).
14. Id. at 533.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 533 n.1.
17. Id. at 533.
18. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Shaw's The Equalizer script into a television series.19 Accordingly, in
July of 1978, Shaw delivered his script to Lindheim.2 ° However, because
NBC declined to produce The Equalizer as a weekly television series, all
rights in the script reverted back to Shaw.2
In 1979, Lindheim left NBC and began working for Universal Tele-
vision ("Universal").22 In 1981, during his employment with Universal,
Lindheim allegedly authored a television series pilot which was also enti-
tled The Equalizer. 23 Lindheim nevertheless admitted that he copied the
title of his pilot from Shaw's script.24 In 1982, Lindheim's pilot was sub-
sequently revised and supplemented through the efforts of another au-
thor, Michael Sloan.2" This revised script ultimately became The
Equalizer television series featured on CBS beginning in 1985.26
On November 19, 1987 Lou Shaw filed suit for copyright infringe-
ment and unfair competition against Lindheim, Sloan and other related
parties.27 In his claim for copyright infringement, Shaw alleged that the
defendants' pilot script was substantially similar to his script, The Equal-
izer, that he had previously submitted to and had reviewed by Lind-
heim.2 a In response, the defendants moved for summary judgment.29
III. THE COURT'S HOLDING









27. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1990). Although Shaw asserted two
causes of action, this note will only address that for copyright infringement. Shaw also ap-
pealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on his claim that the defendants vio-
lated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a). Id. at 542. Under section 43(a),
a person is liable for using a false description of origin in connection with any goods or services
put into commerce. Id. at 541-42 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988)). The district court dis-
missed Shaw's claim under the Lanham Act based on its finding that there was no substantial
similarity between Shaw's script and the defendants' pilot. Id. at 542.
On appeal, Shaw contended that the "false designation of origin" language in the Lan-
ham Act includes instances where defendant has copied a product and committed "reverse
passing off" by selling it under his own label. Id at 542. Despite the Ninth Circuit's finding
of substantial similarity between the works, it nonetheless affirmed the district court's dismis-
sal of Shaw's Lanham Act claim. Id The court's decision was based primarily on the fact that
the Copyright Act provided Shaw with an adequate remedy. Id.
28. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1990).
29. Id
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the two scripts were substantially similar as to the objective characteris-
tics of theme, plot, sequence of events, characters, dialogue, setting,
mood and pace.30 This finding was based on the district court's analysis
under the "extrinsic" prong of the Krofft test,3 traditionally employed to
compare similarity of ideas.32 Nevertheless, the court further found that
no reasonable jury could determine that the works had a substantially
similar total concept and feel.33 This finding was based on the court's
analysis under the "intrinsic" prong of the Krofft test, traditionally used
to compare similarity of protectable expression. 34 Consequently, the dis-
trict court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.35
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. 36 The court held that it is improper
for a court to find that there is no substantial similarity as a matter of law
where the author has satisfied the "extrinsic" prong of the Krofft test.37
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit announced a new rule for copyright in-
fringement determinations: "that satisfaction of the extrinsic test [alone]
creates a triable issue of fact in a copyright action involving a literary
work .... 3
IV. BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Purposes of Copyright Law
Authorities note that one of the primary goals of copyright law is
"to promote the 'progress of science and useful arts' by protecting the
labors of those who create original works and thereby ensuring the profit-
ability of their endeavors and their willingness to bring novel ideas to the
public."' 39 This goal is implemented by the extension of copyright pro-
tection against infringement and the legal remedies available to authors
30. Id. at 535.
31. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977). This test will be discussed more fully in the latter sections of this note.
32. Id.
33. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1990).
34. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
35. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1990).
36. Id. at 541.
37. Id. at 537.
38. Id. Traditionally, the Ninth Circuit required the plaintiff to demonstrate a triable is-
sue of substantial similarity under both the extrinsic and intrinsic prongs of Krofft. Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
1977).
39. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (quoting Sony
Corp v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 428-29 (1984)).
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to prevent and punish infringements.'
Conversely, courts have also recognized that too much protection
"can deter the creation of new works if [individuals] are fearful that their
creations will too readily be found to be substantially similar to pre-ex-
isting works."4 1 In other words, if authors could remove general ideas
from the public domain by using them in published works, they would
stifle rather than advance the development and exploitation of new
ideas.42 Such a result is likely since overprotection would narrow the
field of thought available for use in the development of creative, copy-
rightable works. Therefore, copyright protection must be closely moni-
tored to allow authors "to experience the necessary encouragement to
create while allowing society use of the conceptual subject matter upon
which the creation is based."43
To accommodate these divergent interests, courts have developed
what is commonly referred to as the "idea-expression dichotomy."" The
basic premise underlying the idea-expression dichotomy is that copyright
protection extends only to protectable forms of expression embodied in a
copyrighted work.45 As Judge Learned Hand announced in National
Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications :' "[A] copyright never
extends to the 'idea' of the 'work,' but only to its 'expression,' and ... no
one infringes, unless he descends so far into what is concrete as to invade
that 'expression.' ,c7 In addition, Congress has codified the idea-expres-
sion dichotomy in the current Copyright Act as follows: "In no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, [or] process . . 48
While this dichotomy is imprecise, it is a useful analytical tool for
distinguishing infringing from non-infringing works, especially where the
allegedly infringing work is accused of what Professor Nimmer called
40. See Recent Developments, Substantial Similarity Between Video Games: An Old Copy-
right Problem in a New Medium, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1277, 1286 (1986).
41. Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983).
42. See 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[A] (1990) [Hereinafter referred
to as NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
43. S. Knowles & R. Palmieri, Dissecting Krofft: An Expression of New Technology in
Copyright, 8 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 109 (1980).
44. Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983).
45. See Recent Developments, supra note 40, at 1280 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
217 (1954)).
46. 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951).
47. Id. at 600.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
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"comprehensive nonliteral similarity."49 Infringement which constitutes
nonliteral similarity occurs where the fundamental essence or structure
of a work has been duplicated.5" Accordingly, as demonstrated below,
the modem expansion of copyright protection requires principles such as
the idea-expression dichotomy to define the scope of copyright protection
while maintaining the goals underlying copyright law. Courts have come
to rely on this idea-expression dichotomy in developing judicial tests for
substantial similarity between works.
B. Expansion of Copyright Protection
Historically, copyright law only afforded protection against literal
copying of an author's copyrighted work.5" However, under current
copyright law, near identity of the works at issue is no longer necessary
to establish copyright infringement.52 As the Ninth Circuit recognized in
Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp. :-
[A]n infringement is not confined to literal and exact repetition
or reproduction; it includes also the various modes in which the
matter of any work may be adopted, imitated, transferred, or
reproduced, with more or less colorable alterations to disguise
the piracy.
54
To establish a successful claim for copyright infringement today, the
Ninth Circuit requires a plaintiff to prove: (1) ownership of a valid copy-
right and (2) "copying" of protectable expression by the defendant. 5
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, registration of the work with the
copyright office constitutes "prima facie evidence of the validity of the
copyright." 56 Thus, to demonstrate ownership of a valid copyright, one
need only register his or her work with the United States Copyright of-
fice. Next, because direct proof of "copying" is rarely available, a plain-
tiff may establish copying by circumstantial evidence of: (1) defendant's
access to the copyrighted work, prior to the creation of the defendant's
work and (2) substantial similarity of both general ideas and expression
49. Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing
3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 42, § 13.03[A][1]).
50. Id.
51. E. Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REv. 321,
325 (1989).
52. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167
(9th Cir. 1977).
53. 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
54. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167
(9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Universal Pictures, 162 F.2d at 360 (9th Cir. 1947)).
55. Id. at 1162.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1976).
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of those ideas between the copyrighted work and the defendant's work.57
For the works to be substantially similar, the defendant must have cop-
ied a substantial and material amount of the plaintiff's protectable
expression."
This last concept, substantial similarity of protectable expression
and unprotectable ideas, has proven to be the most elusive concept in
copyright law. As Professor Nimmer59 emphasized: "The determination
of similarity which will constitute a substantial and hence infringing sim-
ilarity presents one of the most difficult questions in copyright
law.. .. " Therefore, courts have relied on the traditional idea-expres-
sion dichotomy in developing judicial tests for substantial similarity.
C. Judicial Tests for Substantial Similarity
The emergence of the idea-expression distinction engendered a con-
tinual struggle by courts to establish workable standards for determining
when copying is sufficiently substantial to constitute infringement. The
traditional ordinary observer test alone does not provide the analytic ba-
sis needed to distinguish between similarity from copying of expression
and similarity due to non-copyrightable materials. As a result, courts
have looked to a framework which uses the ordinary observer test, but
which avoids its limitations.6"
1. The Arnstein Test
Most judicial tests for substantial similarity stem from the tradi-
tional ordinary observer or audience test:
The question.., in such comparison is to ascertain the effect of
the alleged infringing [work] .. .upon the average reasonable
man. If an ordinary person who has recently read the story sits
through the presentation of the picture, if there has been liter-
ary piracy of the story, he should detect that fact without any
aid or suggestion or critical analysis by others. The reaction of
the public to the matter should be spontaneous and
immediate.62
57. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
58. M. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, § 9.5, at 268 (1989).
59. The late Professor Nimmer is a well known scholar in the field of intellectual property
and the first amendment.
60. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 42, § 13.02[C], at 13-23.
61. M. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, § 9.6, at 274 (1989).
62. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 42, § 13.03[E], at 13-62.3-62.4 (quoting Harold
Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933)).
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One of the earliest modifications of the ordinary observer test was
developed by the Second Circuit in Arnstein v. Porter. 63 The Arnstein test
for substantial similarity is divided into two stages.64 Under the first
stage of the infringement analysis, the two works are compared, in their
entirety, to determine if there is substantial similarity between both pro-
tectable and unprotectable components of the works.65 That is, the
factfinder must determine whether the two works are sufficiently similar
to constitute permissible copying.66 Expert testimony and analytic dis-
section may be employed to assist the factfinder in this determination.67
Under the second stage of the infringement analysis, the factfinder
must determine whether the alleged infringer's copying went so far as to
constitute infringement. Copying only trivial aspects of another's work
will not result in a finding of substantial similarity; infringement occurs
only when the copying is sufficiently extensive.68  The test employed
here is as follows: "[W]hether defendant took from plaintiff's works so
much of what is pleasing to the [senses of the lay consumer], who com-
prise the audience for whom [the work was created] that defendant
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff."69
The ultimate determination of unlawful appropriation depends upon
whether substantial similarity exists between the protectable expression
within both works.7' Because this determination depends upon the re-
sponse of the lay listener, expert testimony and analytic dissection are
generally disfavored here.7'
63. 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). This test has been labeled the Audience Test.
64. Id. at 468. To avoid confusing the separate elements essential to a plaintiff's suit for
copyright infringement, the Arnstein court divided the issue of substantial similarity into two
separate elements: (1) that defendant copied from the plaintiff's copyrighted work (permissi-
ble copying) and (2) that the copying (once proven) went so far as to constitute improper
appropriation (illicit infringing copying). Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). Analytic dissection is achieved
by breaking down the works and comparing their elements.
68. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 42, § 13.03[A][l] at 13-25-26 (Where the
defendant copied not merely the general idea, but the expression of those ideas contained in the
plaintiff's work, the two works are substantially similar and infringement may be found.).
69. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
70. Note, Facing The Nation: The Standards For Copyright, Infringement, and Fair Use of
Factual Works 134 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 564-65 (1986).
71. Id. at 558 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). The Arnstein
court noted that expert testimony may be used to aid the jury in reaching its conclusion as to
the response of a lay audience. Id.
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2. The Krofft Test
Building upon the Arnstein test, the Ninth Circuit developed a two-
part test for substantial similarity in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Pro-
ductions v. McDonald's Corp..72 The first step in the Krofft analysis em-
ploys a so-called extrinsic test.73 Under this test, the works are
extrinsically compared to determine if there is substantial similarity of
ideas forming the foundation of both works.74 Since the nature of this
test is extrinsic, expert testimony and analytic dissection may be em-
ployed to assist the trier of fact.7" According to Kroffl, substantial simi-
larity must be demonstrated under the extrinsic test before the trier of
fact examines substantial similarity under the intrinsic test.76 Thus, if a
court does not find substantial similarity when it applies the extrinsic
test, the intrinsic test is never applied and no infringement may be
found.77
The second step of the Krofft analysis employs an intrinsic test.78
Under this prong of the test, the trier of fact must determine whether
there is substantial similarity in the expression of the ideas of the respec-
tive works to constitute infringement. 79 That is, the court must deter-
mine whether the alleged infringer has captured "the total concept and
feel" of the creator's work.8" This second step is labeled an intrinsic test
because it depends on the observations and impressions of the ordinary
observer.8" For this reason, expert testimony and dissection are inappro-
priate here.
8 2
The Krofft court, based upon the Arnstein analysis, attempted to
bring greater clarity and precision to the law of copyright by developing
the foregoing two-part test for substantial similarity. 3 However, unlike
Arnstein, the Krofft test fails to establish the necessary distinction be-
tween the dual uses of substantial similarity. For this reason, the concept




75. Id. at 1165.
76. Id. at 1164.
77. S. Knowles & R. Palmieri, supra note 43, at 134.
78. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
79. Id.




83. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 42, § 13.03[E][1], at 13-62.13.
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of substantial similarity has been seemingly distorted in the Ninth Cir-
cuit's infringement decisions.
In interpreting Arnstein, the Kroft court acknowledged that to con-
stitute infringement, copying must reach the point of "unlawful appro-
priation."" In other words, the alleged infringer's copying from the
creator's work must extend to protectable expression. As the Stillman
court articulated: "[C]opyright laws do not protect ideas... but only
the expressions of ideas. Copying occurs when a defendant usurps the
former; unlawful appropriation, however, requires the purloining of ex-
pression as well."' '85 The Ninth Circuit chose to analyze this distinction
in terms of the elements involved (idea and expression) and the tests em-
ployed (extrinsic and intrinsic) to distill the different degrees of similar-
ity. 6 Accordingly, the primary task in infringement suits has become
the determination of whether there has been copying of expression rather
than just the underlying ideas.8 7 Nevertheless, the Kroff test permits a
finding of infringement only if the plaintiff proves both substantial simi-
larity of general ideas under the extrinsic test and substantial similarity
of protectable expression of those ideas under the intrinsic test. 8
American courts have thus adopted the term substantial similarity
to define the extent of similarity that a plaintiff must demonstrate in or-
der to prove infringement between the copyrighted work and the defend-
ant's work.8 9 As indicated above, this concept of substantial similarity is
applied "to strike a delicate balance between the protection to which au-
thors are entitled under an act of Congress and the freedom that exists
for all others to create their works outside the area protected against
infringement."'
V. THE REASONING OF THE COURTS
A. The District Court's Reasoning
In analyzing the defendants' motion for summary judgment on
Shaw's claim for copyright infringement, the district court applied the
traditional Krofft test.9 Under the extrinsic prong of Krofft,92 the dis-
84. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
85. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
86. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165
(9th Cir. 1977).
87. Id. at 1164.
88. Id.
89. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 42, § 13.03[A], at 13-15.
90. Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983).
91. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1990).
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trict court examined the similarities in ideas by comparing theme, plot,
sequence of events, characters, dialogue, setting, mood and pace of both
works.93 The analysis of these characteristics led the court to conclude
that reasonable minds might differ as to the substantial similarity be-
tween the general ideas of the respective works.9' In other words, the
district court found that Shaw demonstrated a triable issue regarding
substantial similarity of ideas.
Conversely, under the intrinsic prong of the Krofft test, the district
court concluded that reasonable minds could not differ as to whether the
works had a substantially similar "total concept and feel."" Based on
Shaw's failure to establish that the defendants had appropriated a sub-
stantial amount of protected expression from his script under the intrin-
sic test, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.96
B. The Ninth Circuit Court's Reasoning
Like many courts before it, the Shaw court commented that substan-
tial similarity as a matter of copyright infringement is an extremely elu-
sive concept. 97 It is virtually impossible to articulate a definitive
standard which adequately measures the similarities between two works
which would reveal copying of protected expression.9" Nevertheless, the
court referred to the bifurcated test developed by the Ninth Circuit in
Krofft 9 9 as the most comprehensive test for determining the issue of sub-
stantial similarity.l"° Accordingly, the Shaw court used the traditional
Krofft test as a springboard for creating its own judicial test for substan-
tial similarity.
1. Shaw's Reformulation of the Krofft Test
In Shaw v. Lindheim,"'0 the Ninth Circuit examined Shaw's claim
for copyright infringement under a modified version of the bifurcated
Krofft analysis. °2 Under the Shaw court's reformulated Krofft test, "a
92. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
93. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 535-36 (9th Cir. 1990).
94. Id. at 536.
95. Id at 535.
96. Id at 536.
97. Id. at 534.
98. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1990).
99. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
100. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1990).
101. Id. at 531.
102. Id. at 539-41.
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showing of substantial similarity with reference to the eight objective
components of expression in the extrinsic test applied to literary works
creates a genuine issue for trial."' ° Consequently, if a court's analysis
under the extrinsic test alone indicates that reasonable minds could con-
clude that there is substantial similarity between the protectable expres-
sion of both works, there exists a triable issue which precludes summary
judgment against the plaintiff." Although the analysis of the Shaw
court appears sound, its reformulated version of the Krofft test is none-
theless problematic.
2. Rationale Underlying the Shaw Test
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Shaw was based primarily on its per-
ception that the traditional Kroffl bifurcated analysis, based on the ex-
trinsic/intrinsic distinction between ideas and expression, has changed
drastically. 0 5 In this court's view, the traditional two-prong Krofft test
has evolved into "objective and subjective analyses of expression."'"
This evolution has apparently expanded the modem extrinsic test to en-
compass all objective elements of expression.' 7 Specifically, the Shaw
court noted that prior panels have looked to the "concrete elements of
the works" to assist in this extrinsic comparison.' 08 These concrete ele-
ments include: plot, character, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace and
sequence of events."°9 By looking to such objective elements of the dis-
puted works, this prong effectively compares substantial similarity of ex-
pression rather than similarity of mere ideas." 0
This evolution of the extrinsic test has purportedly left the intrinsic
test a mere subjective assessment of similarities in expression."' Hence,
the court deemed the intrinsic test "virtually devoid of analysis" and
therefore impractical for the purposes of summary judgment motions." 2
Summary judgment motions should not be decided on "a purely subjec-
tive determination of similarity" as would occur under the current intrin-
sic test." 3 The court reasoned that engaging in subjective analyses in
deciding infringement as a matter of law is inappropriate: "the judge's
103. Id. at 539.
104. Id. at 535.
105. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1990).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id at 534 (citing Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1989)).
109. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1990).
110. Id. at 535.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 537.
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function is not [herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of
the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."'" 4
Therefore, the Shaw court determined that these changes in the Krofft
two-part test necessitated a new standard for determining whether a
plaintiff has created a triable issue of substantial similarity." 5
According to Shaw, the appropriateness of summary judgment de-
pends upon "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law." ' 6 Further, the court announced that:
Although summary judgment is not highly favored on ques-
tions of substantial similarity in copyright cases, summary
judgment is appropriate if the court can conclude, after viewing
the evidence and drawing inferences in a manner most
favorable to the non-moving party, that no reasonable juror
could find substantial similarity of ideas and expression. 17
Consequently, the court held that "a showing of substantial similarity
with reference to the eight objective components of expression in the ex-
trinsic test.., creates a genuine issue for trial. '  The court reasoned
that since individuals differ in reasoning and emotional reaction, a sub-
jective comparison of literary works "that are objectively similar in their
expression of ideas must be left to the trier of fact.""' 9 As a result, the
Shaw court found it improper to hold that no substantial similarity exists
between the works, as a matter of law, where the author has satisfied the
extrinsic, but not the intrinsic, test.' 2°
The Shaw court further attempted to justify this new test by distin-
guishing, from the instant case, contrary opinions which affirmed grants
of summary judgment for defendant on the issue of substantial similarity.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that it had been appropriate in Aliotti v.
R. Dakin & Co. 2 ("Aliotti") and Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 1
22
("Data East") for the court to engage in a subjective assessment of sub-
stantial similarity in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 123 How-
114. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (bracketted material original).
115. Id. at 539.
116. Id. at 537 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)).
117. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Narell v. Freeman, 872
F.2d 907, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added)).
118. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 539 (9th Cir. 1990).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 537.
121. 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
122. 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
123. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 1990).
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ever, the holdings in both Aliotti and Data East were based on a limiting
principle not found in the instant case. This limiting principle was de-
scribed as follows: "no substantial similarity of expression will be found
when 'the idea and its expression are.., inseparable,' given that 'protect-
ing the expression in such instances could confer a monopoly of the idea
upon the copyright owner.' ",124
In Aliotti, the owner of the copyright in the "Ding-A-Saurs" line of
toy dinosaurs brought an infringement suit against the manufacturers of
a similar line of toy dinosaurs known as "prehistoric pets."' 25 In review-
ing the infringement claim, the court stated that similarity of expression
could not be established by the mere fact that both dinosaurs are "gentle
and cuddly" given that most stuffed toys are designed this way.126 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that "[n]o copyright protection may be afforded
to the idea of producing stuffed dinosaur toys or to elements of expres-
sion that necessarily follow from the idea of such dolls."'
127
Similarly, in Data East, the plaintiffs alleged that the World Karate
Championship home video game developed and distributed by defendant
infringed their copyright in the Karate Champ home video game.'12 Af-
ter analyzing the features of both games, the court found that the visual
depiction of karate matches which necessarily follows from the idea of
karate combat is thus inseparable from the sport of karate. 29 As such,
the expression inherent in the plaintiff's video game is not protectable.1
3 0
Based on these cases, the Shaw court emphasized that the subjective
analysis of substantial similarity as a matter of law is appropriate in a
limited context; where there is unity of an idea and the expression of that
idea. 13'
Additionally, the court announced that the Ninth Circuit has im-
plicitly recognized the distinction between contexts where idea and ex-
pression merge in works and those where the idea is distinct from the
written expression of that idea.' 32 Given the variety of possible expres-
sions of an idea together with the objective criteria available under the
extrinsic test, the court concluded that the intrinsic test cannot remain
124. Id. at 538 (citing Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d at 208 (quoting Aliotti
v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d at 901.)).
125. Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
126. Id. at 901.
127. Id. (citing Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.
1971) (finding the idea and expression of jeweled bee pins to be inseparable)).
128. Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 205-06 (9th Cir. 1988).
129. Id. at 209.
130. Id.




the sole basis for granting summary judgment. 133
C. Application of the Reformulated Krofft Test
In Shaw, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that to establish a successful
copyright infringement claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or
she owns a valid copyright and that the defendant copied protectable
elements of the work.' 34  Because direct evidence of copying is rarely
available, a plaintiff may establish copying by showing that the infringer
had access to the work and that the two works are substantially simi-
lar.' 35 As the defendants in Shaw conceded the issues of Shaw's valid
copyright and their access to Shaw's work, the only issue was that of
substantial similarity as an element of copying.
Nevertheless, before reviewing the district court's findings under the
reformulated Krofft test, the court examined the effect of the defendants'
access to Shaw's work and the effect of identical titles on the issue of
substantial similarity. 136 Although access was not at issue since defend-
ants conceded access to Shaw's script, the court nonetheless focused on
access in relation to the plaintiff's burden of proof for substantial similar-
ity. 37 Pursuant to the "Inverse Ratio Rule" enunciated in Krofft, proof
of a high degree of access justifies a lower standard of proof needed to
demonstrate substantial similarity concerning the element of copying.
13
133. Id.
134. Id at 533-34.
135. d at 534 (citing Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1989)).
136. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1990). A third factor not mentioned
but likely considered by the Shaw court was the nature of the defendant's conduct in appropri-
ating the plaintiff's copyrighted work. In particular, when the defendant's method of appro-
priating a copyrighted work offends a court, such conduct can often influence the court's
decision. See Recent Developments, supra note 40, at 1284. For instance, in Runge v. Lee,
after publishing a book concerning newly developed facial exercise techniques the plaintiff
hired the defendant and taught her these new exercises. Runge, 441 F.2d 579, 580 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 887 (1971). When the defendant left the plaintiff's employ, she pub-
lished her own book describing the facial techniques contained in the plaintiff's copyrighted
book. Id Consequently, the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant's actions constituted
copyright infringement. Id.
It is likewise plausible that the Shaw court's holding in favor of the plaintiff was based on
this very premise. Defendant Lindheim's method of appropriating Shaw's script likely of-
fended the Ninth Circuit's sense of justice. Specifically, to be considered for production as a
television series, Shaw was required to submit his script to Lindheim, as the head of the Dra-
matic Programming Department at NBC. Accordingly, Lindheim took unfair advantage of
this position of authority by appropriating Shaw's script at that time.
137. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 539 (9th Cir. 1990).
138. Id. (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977)): "[W]here clear and convincing evidence of access is presented, the
quantum of proof required to show substantial similarity may... be lower than when access is
shown merely by a preponderance of the evidence." Id
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This Inverse Ratio Rule provides that the greater the evidence of "ac-
cess" the lesser degree of substantial similarity is needed to establish
copying. 139 Hence, the court found the defendants' admission of access
to Shaw's script to be a factor in Shaw's favor."4°
The court further indicated the fact that the two works were entitled
The Equalizer weighed in Shaw's favor: "[i]f the copying of a title is not
an act of copyright infringement, it may ... have copyright significance
as one factor in establishing whether the substance of plaintiff's work has
been copied."14'
Finally, the court applied the extrinsic test to the disputed scripts to
determine whether Shaw had demonstrated a genuine issue for trial. Ap-
plying the objective criteria in its extrinsic comparison of the works, the
court found the plaintiff's script and the defendants' The Equalizer series
to be substantially similar in theme, plot, sequence of events and
dialogue. 
42
In examining the similarities in theme, the court noted that both
plaintiff's and defendants' The Equalizer storylines focused on the Equal-
izer character.143 Both scripts revolve around the Equalizer, a lone man
working outside the traditional law enforcement system. 144 However,
the similarities in theme extend beyond the lead character: "[T]he
Equalizer in each script solicits clients requiring assistance that conven-
tional law enforcement cannot offer ... each lead character describes his
role as to 'equalize' or 'shake up' the odds."
Turning to similarities in plot and sequence of events, the Shaw
court found many of the events in both works to be substantially simi-
lar. 146 For instance: (1) both works involved a criminal organization
that blackmails a candidate for public office; and (2) both organizations
attempt to kill, by means of an oncoming truck, a prospective equalizer
client, who had discovered the organization.' The court emphasized
that although these events may not appear unique by themselves, "the
fact that both scripts contain all of these similar events should give rise to
139. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 539 (9th Cir. 1990).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 540 (quoting 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.16, at 2-188 (1989)).
142. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the court also found
that similarities in setting, mood and pace of both works were attributable to any action adven-
ture and thus constituted unprotectable expression. For this reason, these objective elements
could not be considered in the court's determination of substantial similarity. Id. at 541.
143. Id. at 540.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 540-41.
147. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 1990).
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a triable question of substantial similarity."14
Finally, the court found striking similarities in the dialogue and
characters in both works: "Both leads are well dressed, wealthy and
have expensive tastes. The most striking similarity is their self-assured-
ness and unshakable faith in the satisfactory outcome of any difficult situ-
ation."' 49 Although the demeanor of the Equalizer may be identical to
that of other action adventure characters such as James Bond, the court
noted that the totality of the similarities between Shaw's lead character,
Jericho, and Lindheim's lead character, McCall, goes beyond any ele-
ments inherent in The Equalizer theme.15° Based on the foregoing, the
court found a sufficient showing of substantial similarity under the ex-
trinsic test to constitute a triable issue as to substantial similarity.' 5 '
Consequently, the district court's grant of summary judgment was re-
versed and Shaw's claim for copyright infringement was remanded for a
trial on the merits.
152
VI. ANALYSIS
A successful claim for copyright infringement necessarily embodies
two types of substantial similarity: substantial similarity relating to
proof of "permissible" copying and substantial similarity relating to "in-
fringing" copying, also referred to as unlawful appropriation.' 53 As one
court has declared, "substantial similarity is not always substantial simi-
larity."'5 4 Therefore, any test developed for determining copyright in-
fringement must clearly distinguish between these dual forms of
substantial similarity. 155
A. Failure of the Shaw Test to Distinguish the Dual Types of
Substantial Similarity
One of the primary defects in the Shaw test is its distortion of the





152. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1990).
153. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); See also Universal Athletic Sales
Co. v. Salkend, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
154. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkend, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 863 (1975).
155. See Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1358-59 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (stressing
the importance of distinguishing between these dual forms of substantial similarity in review-
ing defendant's claim for copyright infringement).
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ment.- 6 Specifically, the reliance on an extrinsic test alone fails to suffi-
ciently distill the dual usages of substantial similarity inherent in modem
copyright law.' 57 As the Stillman '" court accurately reflected, the diffi-
culties in adjudicating copyright infringement actions stem from the
dual usages of substantial similarity: "Substantial similarity can refer to
the likeness between two works sufficient to give rise to an inference...
that the defendant... [copied] the plaintiff's work. Substantial similar-
ity, however, is also used as a term of art relating to the unlawful nature
of the similarities between the works.""5 9
This confusion is initially evident in the Shaw court's characteriza-
tion of the essential elements of a copyright infringement action. As
enunciated by the court: "To establish a successful copyright infringe-
ment claim, Shaw must show that he owns the copyright and that de-
fendant copied protected elements of the work."' "W Further, copying
may be established by circumstantial evidence demonstrating that the
"infringer" had access to the work and that the two works are substan-
tially similar. 161
Applying the so called Inverse Ratio Rule, the court stated that the
defendant's "degree of access justifies a lower standard of proof to show
substantial similarity."' 162 In looking at this Inverse Ratio Rule, the late
Professor Nimmer explained: "[S]ince a very high degree of similarity is
required in order to dispense with proof of access, it must logically follow
that where proof of access is offered, the required degree of similarity may
be somewhat less than would be necessary in the absence of such
proof."1
63
Reliance on the Inverse Ratio Rule, together with this court's char-
acterization of the elements of infringement, seriously confuses the dual
forms of substantial similarity: (1) substantial similarity as an element of
copying and (2) substantial similarity of protectable expression as proof
of unlawful appropriation." 4 The Inverse Ratio Rule is only relevant to
156. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1990).
157. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1358-59 (N.D. Iln. 1989).
158. 720 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. I1. 1989).
159. Id. at 1358. This second form of substantial similarity is otherwise referred to as un-
lawful appropriation.
160. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Narell v. Freeman, 872
F.2d at 910).
161. Id. at 534.
162. Id. at 539.
163. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1172
(9th Cir. 1977) (quoting 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 143.4 at 634 (1976)).
164. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Universal Ath-
letic Sales Co. v. Salkend, 511 F.2d 904, 909-10 (3d Cir. 1975).
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proof of substantial similarity as an element of copying. 165 Conversely,
this rule is not properly applied to reduce plaintiff's burden of proof con-
cerning similarities in protectable expression. Rather, the plaintiff must
provide independent proof of similarities in expression to constitute
infringement.
While the Shaw court's depiction of the evolution of the Krofft test
was accurate, its new test fails to provide a workable framework for adju-
dicating infringement suits. Accordingly, although the court recognized
that a finding of infringement must be based on substantial similarity in
protectable forms of expression,'66 its rule may nonetheless lead to incon-
sistent results. In particular, the employment of the "Inverse Ratio
Rule" may lead to future findings of infringement based on only a mini-
mal degree of similarity between unprotectable elements in the works.
B. Failure to Comport with Copyright Principles
The aforementioned flaws inherent in the Shaw test are nevertheless
not surprising given the shortcomings of the Krofft approach itself. Pri-
marily, the Krofft bifurcated analysis for substantial similarity fails to
provide the needed balance between the competing interests in copyright
law. These interests include the desire to encourage individual ingenuity
in the arts, on one hand, and the desire to promote national progress by
allowing individuals to use the fruits of another's creativity, on the
other. 167 While the Krofft court recognized that copyright protection ex-
tends only to expression, it nonetheless held that to constitute infringe-
ment, there must be "substantial similarity of not only the general ideas
but of the expressions of those ideas as well."'' 68 There is absolutely no
support in copyright law for this notion of idea and expression similarity
as a prerequisite for finding infringement.
It must be remembered that a primary purpose of copyright law is
to create the most efficient and productive balance between protection,
that is, the economic incentive to produce creative works, and dissemina-
tion of information to promote learning and cultural development. 169 By
eliminating the idea-expression distinction, the Shaw test not only fails to
strike the necessary balance between these interests but also, repudiates a
165. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 42, § 13.03[D], at 13-62.1-62.2.
166. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1990).
167. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
168. Sid & Marty Krofl Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
169. See UNITED STATES CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for Limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
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general principle of copyright law: that copyright protection extends
only to an author's expression and not to the underlying ideas or con-
cepts.' 70 To grant protection to mere ideas would permit withdrawal of
general ideas from the stock of materials which would otherwise be avail-
able to authors.' 7 ' Accordingly, such protection would hinder rather
than promote a primary purpose of copyright law.
C. Prejudicial Ramifications of the Shaw Test.
In support of its revised Krofft test, the Ninth Circuit skillfully dis-
tinguished earlier precedent which granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendant.' 72 However, the court failed to recognize the prejudi-
cial effect that the reformulated test would have on future defense mo-
tions for summary judgment. Authorities have noted that Krofft
represents one of the most extreme tests for substantial similarity. The
Krofft two-part test may result in a finding of infringement based on non-
literal taking of expression which borders on the taking of mere ideas. '
71
The approach adopted in Shaw further reduces the plaintiff's bur-
den in opposing a defense motion for summary judgment by only requir-
ing satisfaction of the extrinsic test, a test traditionally employed for
comparing similarities in ideas. Accordingly, Shaw limits, and virtually
eliminates, a court's ability to rule for a defendant before trial "because
ideas underlying the works in most cases are similar in some respect...
[otherwise] plaintiff never would have filed suit.'
174
Although the Shaw approach may serve as a deterrent to potential
infringers, it could also deter wrongly accused defendants from creating
original works in the future. The Krofft court itself acknowledged the
need for a limiting principle to reconcile the divergent goals inherent in
copyright law: "[P]rotection must be closely monitored to permit the
author to experience the necessary encouragement to create while al-
lowing society use of the conceptual subject matter upon which the crea-
170. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 654 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir.
1981): "It is axiomatic that copyright protection only extends to the expression of the author's
ideas, not the idea itself."
171. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
172. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1990). "By creating a discrete set of
standards for determining the objective similarity of literary works, the law of this circuit has
implicitly recognized the distinction between situations in which idea and expression merge [as
in Aliotti and Data East] ... and those in which the idea is distinct from the written expression
of a concept [as in the instant case ..... Id.
173. See E. Samuels, supra note 51, at 353.
174. See Recent Developments, supra note 40, at 1294.
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tion is based."'' 75
While summary judgment is traditionally not favored on questions
of substantial similarity in copyright cases, non-infringement may be de-
termined as a matter of law "either because the similarity between two
works concerns only 'non-copyrightable elements of plaintiff's work,'...
or because no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the
two works are substantially similar... ,176 While the Shaw court prop-
erly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue of
substantial similarity, it nevertheless could have employed an alternative
approach that would provide a sounder analytical basis for deciding fu-
ture infringement claims.
D. Alternative Approach
In Shaw, the Ninth Circuit could have adopted an alternative ap-
proach for determining copyright infringement which is virtually identi-
cal to that currently adhered to by the Second, Third and Seventh Circuit
courts. The superiority of this approach lies in its clarity in defining the
necessary elements of a successful infringement action. Because this al-
ternative approach is premised upon the traditional Arnstein approach, it
provides a more viable framework for analyzing the dual forms of sub-
stantial similarity underlying copyright infringement suits. Thus, the
adoption of the approach set forth below would eliminate the confusion
and inconsistency surrounding the substantial similarity analysis which
has plagued the Ninth Circuit for years.
1. Essential Elements of Copyright Infringement
To establish a successful claim for copyright infringement, the alter-
native approach, like A rnstein, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the fol-
lowing: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; (2) permissible copying; and
(3) unlawful appropriation. 177 To establish permissible copying by the
defendant, a plaintiff must show: (a) access, or a reasonable opportunity
175. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163
(9th Cir. 1977).
176. Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing
Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 918 (2d Cir. 1980)).
177. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (emphasizing the need to
distinguish between "permissible" copying and "illicit infringing" copying.) See also Universal
Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkend, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975)
(effectively restoring the bifurcated analysis originally developed in Arnstein. In Universal Ath-
letic, the court held that to establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove: (1) copy-
ing and (2) substantial similarity between the works. Universal Athletic, 511 F.2d at 907. In
other words, "plaintiff must demonstrate that the copying went so far as to constitute infringe-
ment." Universal Athletic, 511 F.2d at 907.).
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to view, and (b) "marked" similarity 178 between the works "when com-
pared in their entirety, including both protectable and unprotectable ma-
terial."' 179  Proof of permissible copying here calls for "marked," as
opposed to "substantial" similarity, to avoid confusing the degree of sim-
ilarity needed to establish "copying" with that required to prove "unlaw-
ful appropriation."'' "
The only exception to the plaintiff's burden of proof on the issue of
permissible copying arises where similarities between the works are so
striking as to preclude the possibility that the defendant independently
created his or her work.' In this sense, the creator/plaintiff does not
have to establish the infringer's access to the copyrighted work because
such copying cannot be explained by coincidence or independent
creation. 1s
2
Once "permissible" copying has been established, the plaintiff must
prove that this copying was sufficiently substantial to constitute unlawful
appropriation. 8 3 In other words, in determining whether the defend-
ant's copying went so far as to reveal an infringement, the court shall
determine whether the similarities extend to something more than mere
generalized ideas or concepts.' 4 The extent of similarity which will con-
stitute a substantial and hence infringing similarity, however, presents
one of the most difficult questions in copyright law.' s s
Under the alternative approach, the issue of unlawful appropriation
shall be determined by the audience/ordinary observer test.'8 6 The
threshold inquiry here is "whether the accused work is so similar to the
plaintiff's work that an... [ordinary observer] would conclude that the
defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's protectible expression
by taking material of substance and value."'' 8 7 This traditional audience/
ordinary observer test will be supplemented by the use of analytic dissec-
178. Professor Lionel Sobel, Mar. 12, 1990 copyright law lecture.
179. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (quoting 3 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[E], at 13-55 (1988)).
180. See Note, supra note 70, at 557-58 [supporting this distinction because "otherwise, the
copying determination would suffice to decide both issues."]. Note also: This approach does
not adhere to the Inverse Ratio Rule for the reasons set forth earlier.
181. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 42, § 13.03[B], at 13-17.
182. Id.
183. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1946).
184. Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 654 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1981).
185. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 42, § 13.03[A], at 13-16.
186. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 472; Nash v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 704 F. Supp. 823,
826 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
187. Nash v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 704 F. Supp. 823, 826 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (quoting
Atari v. North American, 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982)).
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tion. By employing dissection as an initial step, this approach will better
distinguish unprotectable forms of expression and general ideas from
protectable forms of expression. Dissection will ensure that the determi-
nation of "unlawful appropriation" is based solely on "protectable"
forms of expression. 188 Consequently, the alternative approach will effec-
tuate the primary purposes of copyright law and remain consistent with
current case law, as demonstrated below, by using this revised version of
the audience/ordinary observer test.
2. Fulfillment of Copyright Law Objectives
The audience/ordinary observer test employed under the alternative
approach comports with the principles of copyright law because it recog-
nizes that the audience provides the author or artist with the economic
incentive to create." 9 One of copyright's primary purposes is to en-
courage creativity and dissemination of creative works so that the public
may benefit from the labor of authors:
The Act accomplishes this goal by giving authors a legally pro-
tected interest in the potential rewards resulting from public
approval of their work. If the public perceives the two works as
distinct, then the public gains from having both works. Simi-
larly, if ordinary members of the public cannot recognize the
similarity between an original and allegedly infringing work,
the infringing work probably has not damaged the original
work's value in the market place."9
On the other hand, if the infringer's work could serve as a substitute
for the creator's work, the audience or ordinary observer would buy the
infringer's work instead. In other words, the infringer could eliminate
the market for the creator's work. Hence, the audience test leads to a
finding of infringement only when the creator's audience, the source of
his economic incentive, would deem the infringer's work substantially
188. In examining the second step of the Arnstein test, Professor Nimmer indicated that it
does not seem reasonable to expect the ordinary observer to determine the issue of unlawful
appropriation without dissection at least to delineate that portion of the plaintiff's work which
is protectable. It may be that the Arnstein opinion was not intended to preclude dissection on
the second question for that limited purpose. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 42,
§ 13.03[E][1], at 13-62.9 n.264.
189. Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for Audience Reactions in De-
termining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 393 (1981); See also Arnstein, 154
F.2d at 472 ("The plaintiff's legally protected interest is not, as such, his reputation as a musi-
cian but his interest in the potential financial returns from his compositions which derive from
the lay public's approbation of his efforts.") Id.
190. See Recent Developments, supra note 40, at 1291.
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similar. 191
3. Application of Alternative Approach to Shaw
Applying the alternative approach to Shaw provides a viable ana-
lytic framework for copyright infringement which would yield the same
favorable results for the plaintiff, Shaw. As indicated earlier, the defend-
ants in Shaw conceded that Shaw had a valid copyright and that defend-
ant Lindheim had access to Shaw's script.192 Thus, the only issue under
the element of permissible copying is marked similarity.
Comparing the two scripts in their entirety demonstrates a marked
similarity between them. Both scripts are fast-paced, set in a metropoli-
tan backdrop with "ominous and cynical moods that are lightened by the
Equalizer's victory."'1 93 Although these similarities constitute unprotect-
able forms of expression common to any action-adventure, they are none-
theless applicable under the marked similarity determination.' 94
Further, both works can be characterized as a modern day "Sir
Galahad" adventure. In both the script and the series, the Equalizer is a
lone man working outside the traditional law enforcement system trying
to equalize the odds for less fortunate individuals.'95 Finally, the works
have identical titles. 196 The fact that the defendants appropriated Shaw's
title for their series provides further evidence that the series was intended
to closely resemble Shaw's work. 97
Next, the determination of unlawful appropriation focuses on
whether the defendants appropriated a sufficient portion of plaintiff's
protectable expression to constitute unlawful appropriation.' 98 Before
employing the audience ordinary observer test here, it is necessary to
"dissect" the works and thereby separate the protectable from the unpro-
tectable forms of expression. This dissection can be achieved by dividing
the works into their objective characteristics of mood, setting, pace,
theme, sequence of events, plot, dialogue and characters.' 99
191. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
192. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1990).
193. Id. at 541.
194. See Note, supra note 70, at 558 (The first step in the Arnstein analysis requires the
"factfinder to compare the disputed works without regard to whether the similarities rest on
protectable or unprotectable material.").
195. Shaw v. Lindeim, 908 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1990).
196. Id. at 533.
197. Id. at 539-40.
198. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
199. See Note, All Puff and No Stuff: Avoiding the Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 9 LoY.
L.A. ENT. L.J. 337, 346 n.83 ("Dissection involves analysis and comparison of the works by
breaking them down and comparing the elements.").
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In Shaw, the extrinsic analysis demonstrated that similarities in the
mood, setting and pace of both works could not constitute infringement
since these similarities stem from unprotectable sc~nes i faire. 2°° On the
other hand, an analysis of theme, sequence of events, characters and dia-
logue reflect similarities in protectable forms of expression. 20
The themes of the works are substantially similar in that they re-
volve around the lead character, the Equalizer. The Equalizer is a lone
man working outside the traditional law enforcement system to equalize
the odds for the common people.20 2 This similarity in the theme of both
works extends to elements of protectable expression.
As to sequence of events, many of the events in the two works are
substantially similar. For instance, "[i]n both scripts, henchmen for the
criminal organization interrupt the Equalizer's initial meeting with the
client,.., and are foiled as the Equalizer saves the client. ' 2 3 Although
the events that appear in both works may not seem extraordinarily
unique, the fact that both scripts contain numerous similarities should
give rise to a triable question of substantial similarity.
Finally, similarities between the characters of the two works extend
to protectable expression. The Equalizer describes his job as "the great-
est thing a man could do with his life. .. [that is] help give somebody an
even shot, shake up the odds a little.' ' 2°' As the district court empha-
sized, the most striking similarity between McCall, the defendants' lead
character, and Jericho, Shaw's lead character, "is their self-assuredness
and unshakable faith in the satisfactory outcome of any difficult situa-
tion."2 Moreover, the lead characters are similar in that both are edu-
cated, well dressed, wealthy and have expensive tastes.20 6
The foregoing similarities lead to a finding under the audience ordi-
nary observer test that the defendants have unlawfully appropriated a
substantial amount of Shaw's protectable expression. Due to the nation-
wide televising of The Equalizer produced by the defendants, Shaw no
longer has a viable story to sell. Any broadcasting station which had
previously contemplated producing Shaw's script would no longer be
willing to do so; Shaw's potential audience has been appropriated by the
defendants' The Equalizer series. As authorities have asserted: "If so
much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the
200. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 1990).
201. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 540-41 (9th Cir. 1990).
202. Id. at 540.
203. Id. at 541.
204. Id. at 535.
205. Id. at 536.
206. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1990).
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labors of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent ap-
propriated by another, that is sufficient.., to constitute a piracy .. -207
Under the audience ordinary observer test, a reasonable jury could con-
clude that the words are substantially similar as to the protectable ele-
ments of expression. Therefore, Shaw has presented a triable issue
concerning the elements of "permissible copying" and "unlawful appro-
priation" under the alternative approach, an issue not examined by the
Shaw test.
4. Parallel Approaches Applied by the Circuit Courts
An examination of current case law further demonstrates that the
suggested alternative approach is a workable standard for copyright in-
fringement suits. Recently, many circuit courts have applied modified
versions of the Arnstein approach in determining copyright infringement
claims as a matter of law.208
a. Second Circuit Approach: Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc.2
In Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc.2 1 the Second Circuit upheld the
grant of summary judgment for the defendant since "no reasonable ob-
server could find substantial similarity between the protectable elements
of [the] plaintiff's book, ['Fort Apache'] and defendants' movie ['Fort
Apache: The Bronx']."' ' This infringement suit initially arose out of
those two works which both depicted the violence and urban decay of the
forty-first precinct of the New York City Police Department.21 2 Walker
contended that defendants copied their screenplay from the manuscript
for his book. 2" This copying apparently occurred after the manuscript
disappeared from the forty-first precinct station house shortly after
Walker discussed the book with defendant Gould.21 4
In reaching its conclusion, the court employed a bifurcated analysis
for the infringement determination premised upon the Arnstein ap-
proach. Under the first step of the analysis, evidence of access and sub-
207. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 42, § 13.03[A], at 13-45 (citing Folsom v. Marsh,
9 Fed. Cas. 348, no. 4901 (C.C. Mass. 1841)).
208. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981);
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986); Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720
F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125
(D.N.J. 1982).
209. 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986).
210. Id
211. Id at 46.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 47.
214. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1986).
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stantial similarity were used to determine the issue of copying alone.2 15
Under the second step of the analysis, the plaintiff was required to
demonstrate that the defendant copied "protectible expression" to estab-
lish unlawful appropriation.21 6 The court characterized its review under
this latter step as follows: "To determine whether the grant of summary
judgment was proper, we must decide whether the lack of substantial
similarity between the protectible aspects of the works was 'so clear as to
fall outside the range of disputed fact questions' requiring resolution at
trial."
2 17
In finding that the similarities between the works did not constitute
infringement, the Walker court initially noted that Walker's book was an
account of factual events.218 According to the court, "[t]his renders
proof of infringement more difficult, because copyright protection . . .
does not extend to facts or to true events . .,219 Examining the works
with more specificity, the court emphasized that the primary similarities
between the works constituted unprotectable forms of expression. 22 ° For
instance, the appearance of drunks, prostitutes and other city-dwelling
derelicts "would appear in any realistic work about the work of police-
men in the South Bronx."' 22' Because these elements necessarily result
from the choice of a setting or situation they constitute unprotectable
sc~nes i faire. 2 22 Likewise, "foot chases and the morale problems of po-
licemen" which appear in both works are recurring themes prevalent in
most police fiction.22 3 These elements are likely to appear in any realistic
story concerning the everyday drama of a police officer's work, particu-
larly one set in the South Bronx.22 4 Consequently, the Second Circuit
concluded that the foregoing similarities do not demonstrate a material
issue concerning substantial similarity as a matter of infringement. 22 5
215. Id. at 48.
216. Id. at 50.
217. Id. at 48 (quoting Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 239 (2d
Cir. 1983)).
218. Id. at 49.
219. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1986).




224. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986).
225. Id.
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b. Third Circuit Approach: Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Bandai-America, Inc.226
In Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc.,227 Midway brought
suit against Bandai claiming that Bandai's "Galaxian" video game in-
fringed its copyrighted video game, which was also entitled "Galax-
ian."'22 The similarities between the disputed works consisted of an
"outerspace game wherein a defendant base... controlled by the player,
attempts to fend off attacking hordes of aliens."'229 Against the black
backdrop of the games appears twinkling dots, which flash on and off to
create the illusion that they are moving from the top to the bottom of the
screen.
230
Before analyzing Midway's claim, the district court stated that
copyright infringement involves a two-prong analysis: (1) whether de-
fendant copied the plaintiff's work; and (2) whether there is substantial
similarity between the two works such that copying went so far as to
constitute improper appropriation."' Relying upon the Third Circuit's
opinion in Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkend,2 32 the court further
noted that the concept of substantial similarity is applicable in both
prongs of the infringement analysis.233
The chief difference in the dual uses of substantial similarity stems
from the type of inquiry permissible in each.234 More specifically, the
court emphasized that expert testimony and dissection are proper for es-
tablishing substantial similarity as an element of copying.235 Conversely,
such assistance is generally disfavored for the determination of substan-
tial similarity as proof of improper appropriation. 236 Despite these find-
ings, the court recognized that the ordinary observer test, employed for
the determination of improper appropriation, "must ascend into detail
where necessary to distill the protectable elements of a work."
237
An examination of the works under the two-prong test revealed sev-
226. 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 125.
229. Id. at 144.
230. Id. at 138.
231. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 138 (D.N.J. 1982) (cit-
ing Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkend, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
863 (1975)).
232. 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1975).
233. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 138 (D.N.J. 1982).
234. Id.
235. Id. (citing Universal Athletic, 511 F.2d at 907).
236. Id.
237. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 153 n.40 (D.N.J. 1982).
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eral similarities between the works. First, the musical themes of the two
Galaxian games were fundamentally identical.238 Second, Bandai's in-
sect characters bore a close resemblance to Midway's since both have
bright eyes and two-toned bodies.2 39 Lastly, both games have a back-
ground of twinkling stars set against black space.2' Based on the forego-
ing similarities, the court held that Midway was entitled to a directed
verdict on the issue of "copying." 24'
Conversely, the court declined to enter summary judgment in favor
of Midway on the issue of unlawful appropriation.242 This declination
was based on the principle that "to direct a verdict for [the] plaintiff on
this issue, the works must be virtually identical." '243 This identity be-
tween the works was not sufficiently demonstrated by Midway. Accord-
ingly, the court held that "the Galaxian claim must go to the trier of fact
... on the issue of whether an ordinary lay observer would detect such a
substantial similarity between the two works as to show the copying went
so far as to constitute improper appropriation." 2"
c. Seventh Circuit Approach: Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co.245
Finally, in Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co. ,2 Michael Stillman ("Still-
man") brought a copyright infringement suit against the defendants al-
leging that they copied a silent television commercial he created for
Eastern Airlines ("Eastern").247 This controversy began in 1986, after
Eastern Airlines opted not to use Stillman's silent commercial for its
American market.248 Thereafter, Stillman wrote to United Airline's
("United") president suggesting that United engage Stillman to produce
silent commercials for United's American market.249 Along with the let-
ters, Stillman enclosed copies of the Eastern storyboard.25 ° Although
United never hired Stillman, they aired a silent television commercial in
1987, almost identical to Stillman's.2 ' United's commercial, like Still-
238. Id at 146.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 146-47.
241. Id. at 147.
242. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 149 (D.N.J. 1982).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. 720 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1355.
248. Id. at 1356.
249. Id.
250. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (N.D. Il1. 1989).
251. Id.
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man's, employed silence as a means of attracting the viewers' atten-
tion.252 Both commercials "contained nine screens, the first eight of
which were black with white reverse-type writing fading in and out from
screen to screen .... ""' Nevertheless, Leo Burnett maintained that the
creation of its silent commercial resulted from "lucky inspiration.
254
According to the Stillman court, a plaintiff may prevail on a copy-
right infringement claim by proving: (1) a valid copyright and (2) illicit
copying.255 To establish illicit copying, the plaintiff must demonstrate
both copying and unlawful appropriation. 256 The defendants in Stillman
conceded that the plaintiff owned a valid copyright257 and that they had
copied the basic concept from the plaintiff's work.258 As a result, the
threshold inquiry was whether the defendants were entitled to summary
judgment because they did not appropriate protectable material from the
plaintiff's work.25 9 To determine if the defendants were entitled to sum-
mary judgment, the Stillman court deemed analytic dissection of the
works appropriate to determine if "at least some of what defendant cop-
ied falls into the area of protectible expression."'2"
The defendants contended that their copying of Stillman's use of an
opening screen stating that the commercial is silent was necessary to the
expression of a silent commercial. 26' Because silent commercials can
only be expressed in this stereotyped form, the defendants maintained
that such similarity could not constitute copyright infringement.262
While the Stillman court agreed with the principles espoused by defend-
ants, it nonetheless took the analysis one step farther.263 In particular,
the court found that copyright protection does extend to the creative ar-
252. Id. at 1355.
253. Id. at 1356.
254. Id.
255. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1356. In 1988, Stillman obtained a certificate of registration for his silent com-
mercial from the United States Registration of Copyrights. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1360 (N.D. I11. 1989). See also Nash
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 704 F. Supp. 823, 829 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (The court modified the
Seventh Circuit test here to reflect the current Second Circuit test for substantial similarity. In
particular, the determination of substantial similarity necessary to prove defendant's unlawful
appropriation is broken down into two steps: First, the court must determine whether there
has been copying of protectable expression. If this is found, the court must further determine
if the copied portions of protected expression are so extensive to constitute unlawful appropria-
tion). Id.





rangement and interaction of otherwise unprotectable elements. "
Therefore, the court concluded that, where a jury determines that de-
fendants copied plaintiff's work in making their commercial, and in do-
ing so, created a commercial which evokes a similar response in the
ordinary observer, then defendants invaded protectable expression, and
infringement should be found.265
d. The Ninth Circuit: Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co. 2 and Olson v.
National Broadcasting Co.267
Although the Ninth Circuit has not adopted the recommended al-
ternative approach for copyright infringement actions, recent opinions
demonstrate the Circuit's acceptance of the modified audience test em-
ployed therein. In Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 26 8 the Ninth Circuit modi-
fied the Krofft intrinsic test as follows:
To the extent that it is necessary to determine whether similar-
ities result from unprotectable expression, it is appropriate
under Krofft's intrinsic test to perform analytic dissection of
similarities . . . . [N]o substantial similarity may be found
under the intrinsic test where analytical dissection demon-
strates that all similarities in expression arise from the use of
common ideas.269
Similarly, in Olson v. National Broadcasting Co.,27° Ernest Olson,
the author of the television series pilot Cargo, brought this infringement
action against the producers' of the television series, The A-TeamY.2 1
Both works were action-adventure series designed to portray Vietnam
veterans in a positive light.272 In reviewing Olson's claim, the Ninth Cir-
cuit determined that while a reasonable jury might have found substan-
tial similarity in the total concept and feel of the works, "no substantial
similarity may be found under the intrinsic test where analytic dissection
demonstrates all similarities [in expression] arise from the use of com-
mon ideas."' 213 Again, analytic dissection was necessary to ensure that
the intrinsic comparison does not consider unprotectable forms of ex-
264. Id
265. Id at 1361.
266. 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
267. 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).
268. 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
269. Id at 901 (emphasis omitted).
270. 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).
271. Id at 1447-48.
272. Id at 1450.
273. Id at 1453 (quoting Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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pression.2 74 The only similarities found to exist between plaintiff's Cargo
and defendants' A-Team were "common to the genre of action-adventure
television series and movies"2 7 and thus constituted unprotectable
scenes i faire."' 276 Consequently, the court concluded that no substantial
similarity may be found under the intrinsic test.
2 77
VII. CONCLUSION
For decades, American courts have struggled to create workable
tests for deciding copyright infringement suits. In their quest for the "ul-
timate" test, most courts have recognized the importance of distinguish-
ing the separate forms of substantial similarity to decide infringement
actions. In addition, these courts have acknowledged that any workable
standard for determining infringement must serve the divergent goals of
copyright law.
Originally, in Krofft, the Ninth Circuit developed a two-part test for
substantial similarity that distinguished between similarities of ideas, on
the one hand, and similarities in the expression of those ideas on the
other. This particular use of the idea-expression distinction nevertheless
fails to provide the analytic basis needed to distinguish substantial simi-
larity as an element of copying from substantial similarity as an element
of unlawful appropriation. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit only com-
pounded the distortion surrounding these separate forms of substantial
similarity in Shaw271 when it enunciated a new test for substantial simi-
larity based upon Krofft. By limiting the plaintiff's burden of proof to
substantial similarity under the extrinsic test, the Shaw test essentially
eliminates any recognition of the dual significance of substantial
similarity.
The vast array of copyrighted works and the particular interests at
stake today call for a flexible yet precise framework for determining
copyright infringement. It is important that individual authors know
how a court will apply a settled principle, such as the test for infringe-
ment, so that the individual can determine the scope of his or her copy-
right protection. Likewise, this predictability will enable the public to
assess their right to employ the ideas and concepts underlying the copy-
righted work to create their own copyrightable work. The rule enunci-
274; Id.
275. Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988).
276. Id. at 1453.
277. Id.
278. 908 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990).
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ated in Shaw is far too susceptible to subjective determinations of
copyright infringement.
Therefore, the time has undoubtedly arrived for the Ninth Circuit to
establish a new approach to copyright infringement actions, such as the
alternative approach recommended above. The alternative approach will
preserve the integrity of copyright law by providing the Ninth Circuit
with a more efficient and workable framework for adjudicating infringe-
ment suits. Similar approaches recently employed by the Second, Third
and Seventh Circuits demonstrate the clarity and precision that the alter-
native approach contributes to the infringement determination. Had the
Ninth Circuit employed the alternative approach to Shaw's copyright in-
fringement action, it would have achieved the same results in a more
precise and consistent manner. It is hoped that the Ninth Circuit will
soon realize that its modified Krofft approach only frustrates the infringe-
ment determination, and thereby acknowledge that an entirely new ap-
proach is in order.
Jamie Busching
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